We present a specialized point-counting algorithm for a class of elliptic curves over F p 2 that includes reductions of quadratic Q-curves modulo inert primes and, more generally, any elliptic curve over F p 2 with a low-degree isogeny to its Galois conjugate curve. These curves have interesting cryptographic applications. Our algorithm is a variant of the Schoof-Elkies-Atkin (SEA) algorithm, but with a new, lower-degree endomorphism in place of Frobenius. While it has the same asymptotic asymptotic complexity as SEA, our algorithm is much faster in practice.
Introduction
Computing the cardinalities of the groups of rational points on elliptic curves over finite fields is a fundamental algorithmic challenge in computational number theory, and an essential tool in elliptic curve cryptography. Over finite fields of large characteristic, the best known algorithm is the Schoof-Elkies-Atkin (SEA) algorithm [20] . A lot of work has been put into optimizing the computations for prime fields of large characteristic (see [26] for the most recent record). Many of these improvements carry over to the case of more general finite fields. In this article we define a specialized, faster SEA algorithm for a class of elliptic curves over F p 2 that have useful cryptographic applications. These curves have low-degree inseparable endomorphisms that can be used to accelerate scalar multiplication in elliptic curve cryptosystems [23, 24] ; here, we use those endomorphisms to accelerate point counting. Going beyond cryptography, this class of curves also includes reductions of quadratic Q-curves modulo inert primes, so our algorithm may be useful for studying these curves.
Let q be a power of a prime p > 3 (in our applications, q = p 2 and p is large). Let σ (·) : x −→ x p be the Frobenius automorphism on F q . We extend the action of Frobenius to polynomials over F q by acting on coefficients, and thus to curves over F q by acting on their defining equations: for example, an elliptic curve E/F q and its Galois conjugate curve σ E/F q would be defined by E : y 2 = x 3 + Ax + B and σ E :
If E/F q is an elliptic curve, then there is a p-isogeny π p : E → σ E defined by π p : (x, y) → (x p , y p ). If q = p n , then composing π p , σ π p , . . . , σ n−1 π p yields the Frobenius endomorphism π q : (x, y) → (x q , y q ) of E. Being an endomorphism, π q has a characteristic polynomial Schoof's point counting algorithm [18] determines t ℓ := t E (mod ℓ) for small primes ℓ = p by examining the action of π q on E[ℓ], the ℓ-torsion subscheme of E: we have π 2 q (P ) − [t ℓ ]π q (P ) + [q mod ℓ]P = 0 for P ∈ E[ℓ] .
If we construct a general P as detailed in §2, then finding t ℓ boils down to a series of polynomial operations modulo the ℓ-th division polynomial Ψ ℓ . Schoof's algorithm tests these relations until ℓ > 4 √ q, and then deduces t E from the t ℓ using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). To completely determine t E we need to compute t ℓ for O(log q) primes ℓ, the largest of which is in O(log q); fast polynomial evaluations add some more O(log q) factors, and the final cost is O(log 8 q) with classical arithmetic (or O(log 6 q) with fast arithmetic). This basic algorithm was subsequently improved by Atkin and Elkies; the resulting SEA algorithm (see §4) is now the standard point-counting algorithm for elliptic curves over large characteristic fields.
In this article, we present an algorithm that was designed to compute #E(F p 2 ) when E is the reduction of a low-degree quadratic Q-curve modulo an inert prime. In fact, our algorithm applies to a larger class of curves over finite fields, which we will call admissible curves.
First, recall that every d-isogeny ϑ :
Also, σ acts on isogenies by p-th powering the coefficients of their defining polynomials; so every isogeny ϑ : E → E ′ has a Galois conjugate isogeny σ ϑ :
Composing π p : E → σ E with σ φ : σ E → E, we obtain the associated endomorphism
of degree dp. Note that the requirement p ∤ d implies that both φ and σ φ are separable.
We are particularly interested in curves that are d-admissible for small values of d. When d is extremely small the associated endomorphism can be evaluated very efficiently, and thus used to accelerate scalar multiplication on E for more efficient implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystems (as in [23] , [10] , [3] , [24] , and [4] ). Constructing cryptographically secure curves equipped with efficient endomorphisms is one major motivation for our algorithm; the other is the principle that the presence of special structures demands the use of a specialized algorithm.
From a practical point of view, suitable modifications of the SEA algorithm gives us a very fast probabilistic solution to the point counting problem for admissible curves. The essential idea is to use SEA with the associated endomorphism ψ in place of π q . While the asymptotic complexity of our algorithm is the same as for the unmodified SEA algorithm when d is fixed, there are some important improvements in the big-O constants. Asymptotically, when d is small, our algorithm runs four times faster than SEA (and even faster for smaller p).
It is not hard to see that of the p 2 isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over F p 2 , only O(p) classes correspond to d-admissible curves for any fixed d. But while d-admissible curves with small d may be relatively rare, they appear naturally "in the wild" as reductions of quadratic Q-curves of degree d (elliptic curves over quadratic number fields that are d-isogenous to their Galois conjugates) modulo inert primes. For some small d, these Q-curves occur in oneparameter families; so our algorithm allows the reductions of these families modulo suitable primes to be rapidly searched for cryptographic curves. We explain this further in §9.
Computing with isogenies
We begin by recalling some standard results on isogenies, fixing notation and basic complexities in the process. A classical reference for all this is [7] .
First, let M(n) denote the cost in F q -operations (multiplications) of multiplying two polynomials of degree n. Traditional multiplication gives M(n) = O(n 2 ); fast multiplication gives O(n). Dividing a degree-2n polynomial by a degree-n polynomial costs O(M(n)) F qoperations; the extended GCD of two degree-n polynomials can be computed in O(M(n) log n) F q -operations. The number of roots in F q of a degree-n polynomial F over F q is equal to deg Gcd(x q − x, F (x)), which we can compute in O((log q)M(n)) F q -operations if n ≪ q (this is dominated by the cost of computing x q mod F ; see Appendix A). We will make extensive use of modular composition: if F , G, and H are polynomials over F q with deg F = n, deg G < n, and deg H < n, then we can compute (
, where 2 ≤ ω ≤ 3 is the constant for linear algebra. Using the method of [13] , the cost in F q -operations of performing r modular compositions with the same H and F is
We will always work with elliptic curves E/F q using their Weierstrass models,
where f E is a monic cubic over F q .
For m > 0, the m-th division polynomial Ψ m (x) is the polynomial in F q [x] whose roots are precisely the x-coordinates of the points in
If ℓ is a prime, then the level-ℓ modular polynomial Φ ℓ (J 1 , J 2 ) has degree ℓ + 1 in both J 1 and J 2 , and is defined over Z. If Φ ℓ (j 1 , j 2 ) = 0 for some j 1 and j 2 in F q , then there is an F q -rational ℓ-isogeny between the curves with j-invariants j 1 and j 2 (possibly after a twist). In particular, if we fix an elliptic curve E/F q , then the roots of Φ ℓ (j(E), x) in F q correspond to (the isomorphism classes of) the curves that are ℓ-isogenous to E over F q .
We will need explicit forms for d-isogenies where d is squarefree and prime to p. Every such isogeny can be expressed as a composition of at most one 2-isogeny with at most one odd-degree cyclic isogeny over F q . If ϑ is a 2-isogeny, then it is defined by a rational map
where N , M , and D are polynomials over F q with deg N = deg M = 2 and D = x − x 0 where x 0 is the abscissa of a 2-torsion point. If ϑ is a d-isogeny where d is odd, squarefree, and prime to p, then ϑ is defined by a rational map
where N , M , and D are polynomials over F q with deg
In both cases, the polynomial D(x) cuts out the kernel of ϑ, in the sense that D(x(P )) = 0 if and only if P is a nontrivial element of ker ϑ; we call D the kernel polynomial of ϑ. We suppose we have a subroutine KernelPolynomial(ℓ, E, j 1 ) which, given E and j 1 = j(E 1 ) such that there exists an ℓ-isogeny ϑ : E → E 1 over F q , computes the kernel polynomial D of ϑ and the isogenous curve E 1 in O(ℓ 2 ) F q -operations (using the fast algorithms in [1] ). The algorithms in this article examine the actions of endomorphisms on ker ϑ, where ϑ is either [ℓ] or an ℓ-isogeny, for a series of small primes ℓ. The key is to define a symbolic element of ker ϑ. First, we compute the kernel polynomial D of ϑ (note that D = Ψ ℓ if ϑ = [ℓ]); then, we can construct a symbolic point P of ker ϑ as
We reduce the coordinates of points in P modulo D(X) and
Let e = deg D; then we can compute Q 1 + Q 2 for any Q 1 and Q 2 in P in O(M(e) log e) F qoperations, using the standard affine Weierstrass addition formulae. We can therefore compute [m]Q for any m in Z and Q in P in O((log m)M(e) log e) F q -operations, using a binary method. We let DiscreteLogarithm(Q 1 , Q 2 ) be a subroutine which returns the discrete logarithm of Q 2 to the base Q 1 , where both points are in P , in O( √ eM(e)) F q -operations (using the approach in [8] ; in some cases we can do better [15] ).
, and let e = deg D. Then for any Q in P , we can
, where φ is a d-isogeny with d odd, squarefree, and prime to p (as in ( 2.2)) in
Proof. See Appendix A.
Atkin, Elkies, and volcanic primes
Given an elliptic curve E/F q , we split the primes ℓ = p into three classes: Elkies, Atkin, and volcanic. The volcanic primes fall in two sub-classes: floor-volcanic and upper-volcanic. This classification reflects the structure of the ℓ-isogeny graph near E, which reflects the factorization of Φ ℓ (j(E), x). The facts stated below without proof all follow immediately from well-known observations of Atkin for general ordinary elliptic curves over F q (cf. [20, Prop. 6 
.2]).
Recall that the discriminant of χ πq is ∆ πq := t
where h is an F q -irreducible polynomial of degree ℓ, or upper-volcanic if
with each j i in F q . In each case, the roots j i are the j-invariants of the elliptic curves E i that are ℓ-isogenous to E over F q (up to isomorphism).
We say that ℓ is Elkies if ∆ πq is a nonzero square modulo ℓ. Equivalently, ℓ is Elkies if
where j 1 and j 2 are in F q and the h i are F q -irreducible polynomials, all of the same degree e > 1, with e | (ℓ − 1). In this case, there exist F q -rational ℓ-isogenies ϑ 1 : E → E 1 and ϑ 2 : E → E 2 such that j(E i ) = j i , and the ℓ-torsion decomposes as
We say that ℓ is Atkin if ∆ πq is not a square modulo ℓ. Equivalently, ℓ is Atkin if
where the h i are all irreducible polynomials of the same degree e > 1, with e | (ℓ + 1). Since Φ ℓ (x, j(E)) has no roots in F q , there are no elliptic curves ℓ-isogenous to E over F q .
We can determine the class of a prime ℓ by finding out how many roots Φ ℓ (j(E), x) has in F q . We define a subroutine EvaluatedModularPolynomial(ℓ, E), which computes Φ ℓ (j(E), x) in O(ℓ 3 (log ℓ) 3 log log ℓ) bit operations (under the GRH) using the method of [26] , assuming log q = Θ(ℓ). (Note that in practice, one generally uses precomputed modular polynomials over Z.)
The number of roots is the degree of J = Gcd(x q − x, Φ ℓ (j(E), x)), which we compute at a further cost of O((log q)M(ℓ)) F q -operations. We may then want one of these roots, if any exist; we therefore define a subroutine OneRoot(J) which finds a single root of J. At worst, in the upper-volcanic case, this requires O((log q)M (deg J) log deg J) = O((log q)M (ℓ) log ℓ) F qoperations; at best, in the lower-volcanic and Elkies cases (where J is linear and quadratic, respectively), OneRoot(J) costs O(1) F q -operations.
The SEA algorithm
Algorithm 1 presents a basic version of the SEA algorithm. The main loop computes t ℓ := t E (mod ℓ) for a series of small primes ℓ; then we recover t E from the t ℓ via the CRT.
The complexity of Algorithm 1 (and Algorithm 2 below) depends on the number of nonAtkin primes less than a given bound. The standard (and naïve) heuristic on prime classes is to suppose that the number of Atkin and non-Atkin primes ℓ less than B for a given E/F q is approximately equal when B ∼ log q, as q → ∞. In particular, this means that O(log q) non-Atkin ℓ suffice to determine t E , and the largest such ℓ is in O(log q). While the standard heuristic holds on the average, it is known to fail for some E; Galbraith and Satoh have shown (under the GRH) that for some E/F p we may need to use non-Atkin ℓ as large as O(log 2+ǫ p) (see [17, App. A] ). We refer the reader to [21] and [22] for further details and discussion. Proposition 2. If E/F q is an elliptic curve, then under the standard heuristic on prime classes, Algorithm 1 computes t E in O(log 3 q) expected F q -operations (that is O(log 4 q) expected bit operations, using fast arithmetic).
Proof. The main loop computes a set T of pairs (t ℓ := t E (mod ℓ), ℓ) with T ℓ > 4 √ q. We then recover t E from T via an explicit CRT. Our procedure for computing t ℓ depends on the class of ℓ, which we determine using the method at the end of §3 (Lines 6, 7, and 14).
If ℓ is volcanic (Lines 9 to 13), then ℓ | ∆ πq , so t ℓ = 0 or t ℓ ≡ ±2 √ q (mod ℓ). We distinguish between the three cases by comparing π q (P ) with ±[ √ q mod ℓ]P for a generic element P of the kernel of the rational ℓ-isogeny corresponding to one of the roots of Φ ℓ (j(E), x).
If ℓ is Elkies (Lines 15 to 19), then E[ℓ] decomposes as a direct sum (ker ϑ 1 ) ⊕ (ker ϑ 2 ) of ℓ-isogeny kernels; π q acts as multiplication by eigenvalues λ 1 and λ 2 on ker ϑ 1 and ker ϑ 2 , respectively, with λ 1 λ 2 ≡ q (mod ℓ), so t ℓ ≡ λ 1 + q/λ 1 (mod ℓ); and we can determine λ 1 by solving the discrete logarithm problem π q (P ) = [λ 1 ]P for a symbolic point P of ker ϑ 1 . If ℓ is Atkin, then we skip it completely and do not compute t ℓ (see the discussion in §7).
In terms of F q -operations, determining the class of ℓ costs O(ℓ 2 (log ℓ) 3 log log ℓ + log qM(ℓ)); computing t ℓ then costs O((log q + log ℓ)M(ℓ) log ℓ + ℓ (ω+1)/2 ) for volcanic ℓ, and O((log p + ℓ 1/2 )M(ℓ) + ℓ (ω+1)/2 ) for Elkies ℓ. The standard heuristic on prime classes tells us that we will try O(log q) primes ℓ, and that the largest ℓ are in O(log q); so the total cost of the algorithm is O(log 3 q), as claimed. // T will contain the pairs (t E (mod ℓ), ℓ)
20 return ChineseRemainderTheorem(T ) ;
Admissible curves
From now on, q = p 2 . Recalling Definition 1: let E be a d-admissible curve over F p 2 , with separable d-isogeny φ : E → σ E (satisfying σ φ = ǫφ † with ǫ = ±1), and associated endomorphism ψ = σ φ • π p .
Proposition 3. The associated and Frobenius endomorphisms of E are related by
The characteristic polynomial of ψ is χ ψ (T ) = T 2 − rdT + dp ,
where r is an integer satisfying
In particular,
Proof. Equation (5.1) holds because
The degree of ψ is dp, so ψ has characteristic polynomial χ ψ (T ) = T 2 − xT + dp for some integer x. On the other hand, ǫdπ q has characteristic polynomial T 2 − ǫdt E T + d 2 p 2 ; but ψ 2 = xψ − dp is a root, so x = rd where r satisfies (5.3). We then have ǫdr
Comparing with (5.1), we find rψ = ±(p + ǫπ q ); but then χ ψ (ψ) = 0 implies (5.
This suggests our point-counting strategy, which is to modify the SEA algorithm to compute r instead of t E , by considering the action on E[ℓ] of ψ instead of π q and using fewer primes ℓ. We simplify the task by quickly disposing of the supersingular case, which can be efficiently detected using Sutherland's algorithm [25] , or slightly faster using a probabilistic algorithm.
Proof From now on, we will assume E is ordinary; so End(E) is an order in the quadratic imaginary field Q(π q ), and Z[π q ] and Z[ψ] are orders contained in End(E). Looking at (5.2), we see that the discriminants of Z[ψ] and Z[π q ] are related by
Indeed, since E is ordinary, we have r = 0; so we can rewrite (5.4) as
Deuring's theorem on isogeny classes and class groups (cf. [19, §4] ) can be used to show that the number of F q -isomorphism classes of ordinary d-admissible curves with a given r is H(∆ ψ ), where H is the Kronecker class number. In particular, every r in the interval of (5.5) occurs for some d-admissible E/F q . In the language of isogeny volcanoes [6] : if ℓ is a prime dividing r, then E is somewhere strictly above the floor of the volcano for ℓ; that is, all ℓ | r are upper-volcanic.
Computing the cardinality of admissible curves
Let E/F q be an ordinary d-admissible curve, with associated endomorphism ψ; we want to compute #E(F q ). Many of the techniques used in the conventional SEA algorithm can be transposed to working with ψ instead of π q . Equations (5.3) and (5.5) show that t E is completely determined by |r|, which is bounded by 2 p/d; so we can compute t E by computing r ℓ := r (mod ℓ) for ℓ in a collection of small primes L such that ℓ∈L ℓ > 4 p/d , then recovering r from the r ℓ using the CRT. As a quick comparison, using SEA with π q to compute t E directly would require ℓ∈L ℓ > 4 √ q = 4p.
Proposition 5. If E/F p 2 is d-admissible, then under the standard heuristic on prime classes, Algorithm 2 computes t E in O(log 3 p) expected F q -operations (that is O(log 4 p) expected bit operations, using fast arithmetic).
Proof. We compute t E from r, which we recover exactly using the CRT from the pairs (r ℓ , ℓ) in R, since (r ℓ ,ℓ)∈R ℓ > 4 p/d. Our approach for computing r ℓ depends on which class ℓ falls into; we determine the class of ℓ in Lines 5, 6, and 13 (exactly as in Algorithm 1).
If ℓ is volcanic (Lines 8 to 12), then combining ℓ | ∆ πq with (5.3) yields r ≡ 0 or ±2 p/d (mod ℓ); in particular, if ℓ is volcanic and dp is a nonsquare modulo ℓ, then r ℓ = 0.
If ℓ is Elkies (Lines 14 to 18), then let E[ℓ] = (ker ϑ 1 ) ⊕ (ker ϑ 2 ) be the decomposition of the ℓ-torsion into eigenspaces for π q . Since ℓ is not volcanic we have r ≡ 0 (mod ℓ), so (5.6) shows that the ker ϑ i are also eigenspaces for ψ. So let λ π and λ ψ be the eigenvalues of π q and ψ on ker ϑ 1 (say); then (5.6) yields λ ψ ≡ (p + ǫλ π )/r (mod ℓ), and then
We can therefore compute r ℓ by computing λ ψ , which is the discrete logarithm of ψ(P ) to the base P for a symbolic point P in ker ϑ 1 .
If ℓ is Atkin then we skip it completely, as in Algorithm 1 (but see §7).
In terms of F q -operations, determining the class of ℓ costs O(ℓ 2 (log ℓ) 3 log log ℓ + log qM(ℓ)), while computing r ℓ costs O((log p + log ℓ)M(ℓ) log ℓ + ℓ (ω+1)/2 ) if ℓ is volcanic, and O((log p + ℓ 1/2 )M(ℓ) + ℓ (ω+1)/2 ) if ℓ is Elkies. The standard heuristic on prime classes tell us that we will try O(log p) primes ℓ, the largest of which are in O(log p); so the total complexity is O(log 3 p) F q -operations, as claimed. Remark 1. Suppose ℓ | d and ℓ = 2. Equation (5.3) tells us that t E ≡ 2ǫp (mod ℓ); so ℓ | ∆ πq , and ℓ is volcanic. Moreover, since ∆ ψ = d(dr 2 − 4p), we can deduce that ℓ || ∆ ψ . Note also that End(E) ∼ = End( σ E), so the ℓ-isogeny factoring φ is horizontal; this implies that End(E) is ℓ-maximal. Combined with the above, we see that Z[ψ] is ℓ-maximal in Q(π q ). In particular, if ℓ is upper-volcanic then ℓ | r (and (0, ℓ) can be added to R in Algorithm 2).
Complements
Schoof's original algorithm may be generalized from prime ℓ to small prime powers in a very simple way. Going further, we may use isogeny cycles to compute eigenspaces of π q and ψ on E[ℓ n ] for Elkies ℓ: the methods developed for π q in [5] and [8] generalize to ψ without any difficulty. Once we have recovered
we have k n+1 = k n + τ ℓ n for 0 ≤ τ < ℓ, and we need to test
(here F ℓ n and F ℓ n+1 are factors of Ψ ℓ n and Ψ ℓ n+1 that are minimal polynomials for ℓ n and ℓ n−1 -torsion points). We may extend Algorithms 1 and 2 to use Atkin primes. If ℓ is Atkin, then π q and ψ have no rational eigenspaces in E[ℓ]; but we may still compute t ℓ and r ℓ by working on the full ℓ-torsion, as in Schoof's original algorithm. If P is a symbolic point of E[ℓ] then (χ πq mod ℓ)(P ) = 0, so in // R will contain the pairs (r (mod ℓ), ℓ)
if dp has a square root s modulo ℓ then
19 return ǫ(dr 2 − 2p) where r = ChineseRemainderTheorem(R) ; Algorithm 1, t ℓ is the discrete logarithm of π q (π q (P )) + [q mod ℓ]P to the base π q (P ); similarly, in Algorithm 2, r ℓ is the discrete logarithm of ǫπ q (P ) + [p mod ℓ](P ) to the base ψ(P ) (here we use ψ 2 − drψ + [dp] = d(ǫπ q − rψ + [p]) = 0 and ℓ ∤ d). The kernel polynomial defining E[ℓ] is Ψ ℓ , which we can compute using standard recurrences involving the coefficients of f E (using the method of [2] , for example) in O(M(ℓ 2 ) log ℓ) F q -operations. But Ψ ℓ has degree (ℓ 2 − 1)/2, so computing t ℓ resp. r ℓ costs O((log q)M(ℓ 2 )) resp. O((log p)M(ℓ 2 )) F q -operations; for that cost, we would gain much more information by using a larger Elkies prime instead. Alternatively, we can use Atkin's initial ideas using the splitting degree of Φ ℓ (X, j(E)) to determine a list of potential t ℓ to be used in a tricky match and sort algorithm, or the more advanced algorithm of [12] . In our setting, we could use (5.3) to transform the list of t ℓ 's to build a list of r ℓ 's (on average, this does not increase the size of the lists too much).
Finally, we mention the use of the baby-step giant-step approach to speed up the final computations. If P ∈ E(F q ), then χ ψ (P ) = 0 becomes [ǫd + dp]P = ) for a sufficiently general choice of Q in E(F q ); this is a classical discrete logarithm problem with F q -points, but in a smaller search space than the whole of E(F q ). The optimal threshold for M is best determined through experiments.
Comparison of Algorithms 1 and 2
Let us compare the cost of computing t E with Algorithms 1 and 2 when E is d-admissible. For simplicity, we will suppose that Algorithm 1 also avoids the primes dividing d (these are very few and very small, so they do not contribute asymptotically or practically to the comparison).
The first clear difference between the algorithms is the number and size of primes ℓ used: Algorithm 2 essentially uses the smaller half of the set of primes used by Algorithm 1. The largest primes in each set still have roughly the same size, O(log p), so asymptotically this makes no difference-but using half the number of primes, and the smaller half at that, represents an important improvement in practice.
Now consider the cost of computing t ℓ (as in Algorithm 1) or r ℓ (as in Algorithm 2) for the same ℓ. The costs of determining the class of ℓ and the calls to KernelPolynomial are identical, and the calls to DiscreteLogarithm are equivalent. The only real difference is in how each algorithm computes the relations used to determine t ℓ and r ℓ .
-if ℓ is Elkies, then Algorithm 1 uses 2 × π p while Algorithm 2 uses 1
. In each case, the asymptotic costs are the same; but if d ≪ log p, then the costs are dominated by computations of π p on P (for the same P ). The crucial practical difference is that for each class of prime, Algorithm 2 exchanges half of the computations of π p required by Algorithm 1 for one computation of σ φ, which has a very small cost when d ≪ log p. Hence, for any given prime ℓ, Algorithm 2 should compute r ℓ twice as quickly as Algorithm 1 computes t ℓ .
By our complexity analysis, we see that the largest ℓ is O(log p) instead of O(log q), and we use the the smaller half of them, we expect a real speedup of a factor of four. This is confirmed by our experimental results in §11 below.
Q-curves and other sources of admissible curves
Admissible curves appear naturally as reductions of quadratic Q-curves modulo inert primes (cf. [24, §3] ). As such, we can construct parametrized families of admissible curves over any F p 2 .
Definition 2.
A quadratic Q-curve of degree d is an elliptic curve E without complex multiplication, defined over a quadratic field Q( √ ∆), such that there exists an isogeny of degree d from E to its Galois conjugate τ E, where τ is the conjugation of Q( √ ∆) over Q.
Proof. González shows that a d-isogeny φ : E → τ E must be defined over Q( √ ∆, √ ±d) (see [9, §3] 
We emphasize that if a d-admissible curve E is the reduction of a quadratic Q-curve E, then the associated endomorphism on E is not the reduction of any endomorphism on E. Indeed, E has no non-integer endomorphisms by definition. Example 1. Fix any prime p > 3; the following construction (carried much further in [23] and [24] ) yields a 1-parameter family of 2-admissible curves over F p 2 . Let ∆ be a squarefree integer that is not a square modulo p (so p is inert in Q( √ ∆)), let τ be the involution of Q( √ ∆, √ −2) that restricts to σ modulo p, and let s be a free parameter taking values in Q. The family of curves over Q( √ ∆) defined by E :
with kernel polynomial D(x) = x − 4 (see [11, Prop 3.3] ). Computing φ † and τ φ, we find that τ φ = ǫ φ † , where ǫ = 1 if p ≡ 5, 7 (mod 8) and ǫ = −1 if p ≡ 1, 3 (mod 8). Reducing everything modulo p, as in the proof of Prop. 6, we obtain a family of curves
with the parameter s taking values in F p , equipped with a 2-isogeny φ : E → σ E over F p 2 . Composing π p with σ φ yields the associated endomorphism ψ of E, defined by
Since the definition of admissible curves involves only isogenies over F p 2 , we would expect a characterization of admissible curves over a given F p 2 in terms of modular polynomials.
Proposition 7.
If E is an ordinary elliptic curve over
Proof. If j(E) is a simple root of Φ d (x, x p ) in F q , then up to F q -isomorphism there is a unique d-isogeny φ : E → σ E. If φ were not defined over F q , then the endomorphism σ π p φ would not be defined over F q , hence not commute with π q , contradicting non-supersingularity. For d-admissibility, it remains to show that σ φ = ǫφ † with ǫ = ±1. But if this were not the case, then (
Example 2. Multiple roots of Φ d (x, x p ) may not yield d-admissible curves. Consider the ordinary curve E : y 2 = x 3 + (38 + 53i)x + 27 − 3i over F q = F 103 (i) where i 2 = −1: then j(E) = 35 + 5i is a double root of Φ 3 (x, x 103 ). Indeed, we have a pair of non-isomorphic 3-isogenies φ 1 : E → σ E and φ 2 : E → σ E, with kernel polynomials x + 1 + 39i and x − 4 + 32i, respectively; but σ φ 1 = ±φ 2 † and σ φ 2 = ±φ 1 † , so E is not 3-admissible.
Generating cryptographically strong curves
One of the important motivations for developing our algorithm was the generation of cryptographically strong curves. Indeed, the curves proposed for cryptographic applications in [23] and [24] , and which were subsequently used in fast, compact Diffie-Hellman key exchange software [3] , are admissible. These curves were designed to offer accelerated scalar multiplication (using the associated endomorphism) over fast finite fields, without obstructing twist-security; but when generating twist-secure curves at and above the 128-bit security level, we can expect to try hundreds of thousands of curves before finding a suitable one. In this context of counting many curves, practical speedups become very important.
For cryptographic applications based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem, the minimum requirement for a "secure" curve E/F p 2 is that #E(F p 2 ) = c · n, where n is prime and c is tiny (traditionally, we want c = 1; more modern software using Montgomery and Edwards models requires c = 2 or 4). For some applications we further require "twist-security": that is, the quadratic twist E ′ should satisfy #E ′ (F p 2 ) = c ′ · n ′ , where n ′ is prime and c ′ is tiny. To find a secure or twist-secure curve over F p 2 we typically fix a prime p of bitlength around the required security parameter, then test a series of curves over F p 2 , computing their orders until we find a curve with the right structure. Equation (5.3) implies
This places some immediate constraints on the combinations of d, p, and ǫ that can yield suitable curves. For example, #E( Clearly if E is 2-admissible, then it must have a rational point of order 2, so we cannot do better than having c = c ′ = 2. Similarly, 3-admissible curves must have either 3 | c or 3 | c ′ . Extensive computations done for d = 2 and 3 over a range of primes revealed densities of twist-secure d-admissible curves (modulo the constraints above) similar to the densities of twist-secure general elliptic curves over the same fields.
With Algorithm 1, we can speed up the search for secure curves by checking whether t ℓ ≡ p 2 + 1 (mod ℓ) for each ℓ; if so, then ℓ | #E(F p 2 ), so we can abort the computation and move on to the next candidate curve [14] . Similarly, if t ℓ ≡ −(p 2 + 1) (mod ℓ) then ℓ | #E ′ (F p 2 ). With Algorithm 2, if ℓ divides #E(F p 2 ) then (p + ǫ) 2 ≡ ǫdr 2 (mod ℓ), so ℓ cannot divide #E(F p 2 ) unless ǫd is a square mod ℓ; and if ǫd is a square mod ℓ, then we should abort if r ℓ ≡ ±(p + ǫ)/ √ ǫd (mod ℓ). In fact, if r ℓ ≡ 0 and p + ǫ ≡ 0 (mod ℓ), then the nondegeneracy of the ℓ-Weil pairing implies that E[ℓ](F p 2 ) ∼ = (Z/ℓZ) 2 . Replacing ǫ with −ǫ yields analogous results for the twist E ′ . We note also that there may be an advantage in generating curves using the parameter r and not t E . We could force some value of ℓ to divide r by rejecting curves E for which Φ ℓ (X, j(E)) does not have 1 or ℓ + 1 roots. This has no impact on t E , and we already know r (mod ℓ). We just need to hope that such curves are as secure as general d-admissible curves.
Implementation and experiments
We implemented the new algorithm on top of our implementation of SEA, realized in C++ using NTL 9.6.4 (with gcc 4.9.2). The timings below (in seconds) are for an Intel Xeon platform (E5520 CPU at 2.27GHz). We define two primes (of 128 and 255 bits), derived from the decimal expansion of π: 
